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On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society by Dave Grossman
Book Summary InformationAuthor: Dave Grossman Edition: Paperback Audio: English (Original Language); English (Unknown); English (Published) Published: 1996-11-01 ISBN: 0316330116 Number of pages: 400 Publisher: Back Bay Books
Book Reviews of On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and SocietyBook Review: A Highly Flawed Work on an Important Topic Summary: 1 StarsLTC Grossman's book is highly overrated by far too many readers. His book does offer some valuable information on the combat efficiency of people over time on the modern battlefield. There is also some excellent insight into post-traumatic stress disorder. He suggests that in the past soldiers had more time to reflect and examine their experiences before returning to peaceful lives back home. Either armies had to march home, which could take days if not weeks, or they had to take a ship, which could take a similar amount of time. Our current policy of rapid reintroduction of soldiers just out of a combat zone as a cause of problems today is an important one.
The rest of his book, however, is flawed and should be taken with a grain of salt. To begin with, he takes modern assumptions and assigns them to all eras and epochs of the past, as if people of the past all have the same outlooks and reactions that we do today - they just wore different clothes. His assumption that people are somehow inherently predisposed not to kill each other and only do so with great mental conditioning leading to psychological harm flies in the face of the obvious lessons of history. A reading of history suggests our ancestors often waged aggressive and enthusiastic war with little trouble. Even more importantly, they did not need video games or death metal to encourage them to do it. The society and its views of war, I think, has more to do with reactions of soldiers than any innate mental disposition.
Some items he mentions show a poor understanding of practical matters. He suggests that centurions simply stood around encouraging their soldiers to fight, while a student of Roman warfare would recognize that the centurions were often in the thick of the fighting and doing so by fighting. They often led just as much by example as by shouting orders. The author also asserts that the reason thrusts with a sword are not used much is related to some psycho-sexual mental block. This only proves he has little concept of weapons through the ages, not to say the fact that he has never seriously used one. He also fails to comment on the development of specialized thrusting weapons in the late middle ages or the development of rapiers. That these weapons were used for several hundred years and thrusting the accepted technique for inflicting damage shows a poor understanding of swords, not to say weapons of the past in general. I wonder how he addresses the spear, the most common weapon for thousands of years?
Even more troubling is his use of SLA Marshall's work Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command to justify many of his positions. He quotes Marshall's famous firing rate: less than twenty-five percent of a unit would engage in combat with the enemy. The first problem is: He ignores Marshall's reason for this occurring. Marshall felt a lot of this had to do with the way soldiers were trained - only to fire their weapon if they could see a target. In modern war, a target is not always visible, hence the soldiers did not shoot when shot at. The soldiers who did shoot often were armed with BARS, machine guns, flame-throwers, etc. That is weapons that are meant to be used against an area as much as against individual targets. The second problem is that recent research has suggested that it is very likely Marshall simply made up this figure. His methodology was more focused on recreating the battle experience, not obtaining specific pieces of information for statistical purposes. With doubt cast on Marshall's firing rate, doubt has to be cast on LTC Grossman's conclusions and arguments which stem from it.
Another problem with LTC Grossman's book is that despite saying he conducted over four hundred interviews, he quotes from these very little. In fact, he tends to quote from the same couple of works, Soldiers: A history of men in battle by John Keegan and Richard Holmes and Acts of War: Behavior of Men in Battle by Richard Holmes, over and over again. Because of the repetition and limited sources, many of his assertions seem poorly supported and to rely entirely on the works of other people. If he conducted all these interviews, why does he not reference them more? Also to consider, just because modern people have certain reactions in battle, it does not mean that this is how it has been through time immemorial. This reviewer highly recommends the works of Richard Holmes and John Keegan as an alternative to this poor work.
Finally, when he is given information that runs contrary to his views, he glosses over it or attempts to make it fit his conclusions. The most prominent example regards the guilt officers feel when men under their command die following that officer's orders. Essentially, he says none of the officers he interviewed expressed any guilt. Rather than concluding that maybe they really do not feel guilt, he concludes they must all be suppressing it. This is just absurd - a blatant attempt to make the facts fit a preconceived notion that the author has.
It is unfortunate that this book is accepted so uncritically. His work has affected the work of others in a detrimental manner. The subject is an interesting one, but unfortunately poorly researched. Grossman did do a service in pointing out the importance of the topic. His arguments and conclusion, however, are flawed and poorly thought out. Despite his claim to a history degree, he seems to have a poor grasp of the subject and its study. And in the end his book becomes a screed against violent video games, movies, and music, as if this is to blame for all our problems. My advice is to avoid this book if at all possible.
Summary of On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and SocietyThe twentieth century, with its bloody world wars, revolutions, and genocides accounting for hundreds of millions dead, would seem to prove that human beings are incredibly vicious predators and that killing is as natural as eating. But Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, a psychologist and U.S. Army Ranger, demonstrates this is not the case. The good news, according to Grossman - drawing on dozens of interviews, first-person reports, and historic studies of combat, ranging from Frederick the Great's battles in the eighteenth century through Vietnam - is that the vast majority of soldiers are loath to kill. In World War II, for instance, only 15 to 25 percent of combat infantry were willing to fire their rifles. The provocative news is that modern armies, using Pavlovian and operant conditioning, have learned how to overcome this reluctance. In Korea about 50 percent of combat infantry were willing to shoot, and in Vietnam the figure rose to over 90 percent. The bad news is that by conditioning soldiers to overcome their instinctive loathing of killing, we have drastically increased post-combat stress - witness the devastated psychological state of our Vietnam vets as compared with those from earlier wars. And the truly terrible news is that contemporary civilian society, particularly the media, replicates the army's conditioning techniques and - according to Grossman's controversial thesis - is responsible for our rising rates of murder and violence, particularly among the young. In the explosive last section of the book, he argues that high-body-count movies, television violence (both news and entertainment), and interactive point-and-shoot video games are dangerously similar to thetraining programs that dehumanize the enemy, desensitize soldiers to the psychological ramifications of killing, and make pulling the trigger an automatic response.
General Books
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