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Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 by David Galula
Book Summary InformationAuthor: David Galula Edition: Paperback Audio: English (Unknown); English (Original Language); English (Published) Published: 2006-08-15 ISBN: 0833039202 Number of pages: 324 Publisher: Rand Publishing
Book Reviews of Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958Book Review: Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958 Summary: 5 Stars
Galula's report of his small section of the Algerian war is easily one of the best I have read on counterinsurgent practice.
Galula seems to almost be the poster child of counterinsurgent warfare, having spent significant time in China during Mao's People's Revolution, the Greek civil war and the insurgencies in French Indochina, the Malay Peninsula and the Philippines. With the knowledge he gained from his participation in these conflicts, he brought a wealth of knowledge and a fundamental understanding to Algeria when he requested to be stationed there in 1956. At this point he had worked through what he thought were the correct and incorrect ways to work through an insurgency and was ready to bring them to the fight and test his hypotheses.
His first fundamental understanding which is articulated in the first chapter of the book "The Stage" is Galula's comparison and contrasting of the Chinese model of insurgent warfare and the model that was actively being developed in Algeria at the time. More importantly, it was his fundamental understanding that the objective of this kind of warfare was the population and that decisive victories on either side would only be impacted by the perception of the people of who was winning. His understanding translated into the difference between terrorism and guerrilla operations in which he notices that the "propaganda and persuasion" of the guerrilla campaign was eclipsed throughout the Algerian rebellion by terrorism as the "main force" used to influence the masses .
After laying out the structure and practices of the FLN (National Liberation Front) at the strategic down to the tactical level, Galula describes how he gets after the problem. Galula understood that it was a problem of wills, not only in the length and the ability to outlast the insurgent but also the will his respective organization, versus the insurgents', had over the people. He first articulated this when describing his use of posters to incite the population to care about his goals. Galula would place a poster on a citizen's home and tell the owner he was responsible for that poster and if an insurgent took it down there would be consequences . It was no doubt a small victory, but it was a start. It was a small battle that Galula knew would be easy to win and would put insurgent support on slippery slope.
As Galula's plan became more refined, he instituted a comprehensive census so he would be able to track who was in his area of operations. He also established a dispensary for medical care for citizens, whom he first compulsively forced to come to, but eventually came willingly. Election of provisional governments was another successful non-military operation he instituted in the areas under his command and brought to the forefront leaders which he was able to influence and had influence over their constituents who voted them into office. The last reform we will mention here is the establishment of schools and the compulsory attendance of them (at first) which kept the younger generations occupied and separated from FLN influence while providing them a better way of life. All of these reforms were key to the eventual pacification of the population that supported the insurgents in Galula's areas. However, all of these reforms were painted on the back of significant military operations to "purge" the insurgent forces from the population.
Specifically, these military operations were done in conjunction with or in support of local militias which Galula established. Additionally, in later stages of his counterinsurgency plan, Galula also armed the civilian population so they could act on their own to establish peace. These methods, in combination with the political and infrastructure operations, became so effective, according to Galula that people who were noticed to be new within the cities were stopped by citizens and the militia called to take them to the French military for questioning. Galula tells a story where even a traveler who had been granted a pass by the French military was stopped twice and brought to the post before Galula eventually gave the person an escort until he was able to leave the area.
At this point, after describing all of the good reforms his unit implemented in his area and the wonderful progress the Algerians had made, he starts talking in the opposite direction concerning the shortfalls and problems surrounding his operations. The biggest problem he continues to mention throughout his book is the amount of "red tape" he continuously has to overcome to get the supplies and political flexibility he needs. Due to the dual nature of counterinsurgent warfare between the political and military realms and the lack of knowledge of Soldiers (including high ranking officers) of how to conduct counterinsurgent warfare it was, at times, hard for Galula to completely and efficiently carry out his proven process to pacify the population. Galula was able to overcome some of these problems with an increased amount of effort but was unable to overcome others such as receiving a G.M.P.R to garrison Tala Atmane, a village in his area.
Additionally the obstacle of pacification that Galula identified was the "political instability in France, and the same old lack of a standard operational procedure in Algeria" . He consistently cites these as the reason the counterinsurgent can only convince people to go so far to support the counterinsurgent's cause. He noted that a large part of the support that was given by the population was based on perception of which side would eventually win. As elections were held and debates erupted concerning Algerian independence from French rule, the insurgent activity would wax and as the debates died down it would wane. The population was never completely convinced the French government would be around to outlast the insurgent forces and so only provided so much support to Galula. This is a problem that all democracies have had, and will no doubt continue to have in counterinsurgent warfare.
Throughout Galula's story he also noted that his area of operations was like an island of peace and prosperity within a turbulent Algeria. He could only progress so far in winning the cooperation of the people when a province over there was still major military operations and widespread insurgencies. As the war progressed, Galula makes it evident that the strategies that brought success in his area of operations became to be more widely accepted. However, as CPT Galula was promoted out of his company command it is tragic that a couple of months later his old area of operations digressed to the national average and was no longer as peaceful due to incompetent leadership and the lack of a nationally accepted counterinsurgent strategy.
Overall, Galula paints a very informative picture of the Algerian war and his part in it. It was an easy read and one that very directly translates to counterinsurgent operations today. While it is important to note the take-aways from Galula's book it is also important to note that there may be differences in the FLN insurgency versus modern insurgencies and that certain methods will not garner the same result. But in the end, Galula's strategies no doubt set the framework for counterinsurgent operations as much as Mao set the framework for an insurgency.
Summary of Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France was forced to cope with a varied and adaptable Algerian strategy. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command at the height of the rebellion. This groundbreaking work, with a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman, remains relevant to present-day counterinsurgency operations.
Biographies & Memoirs Books
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